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I.  Introduction
Even a cursory visit to an area affected by toxic
pollution – what some call a toxic tour – may
graphically reveal the scope of environmental
inequities in American society.
In some refinery communities of the Gulf Coast
region, visitors first see acres of imposing industrial
buildings joined by an intricate set of holding tanks,
pipes, and smokestacks.  In the shadows of  these
facilities are tiny houses.  Visit some of  the families
in these houses and you will see that many keep
suitcases filled with essentials by the front door,
tucked perhaps behind the couch, because
evacuations are not uncommon.  There are “shelter in
place” alarms, where children are taught to run inside
and immediately close all the windows and doors.1
Another example:  standing on the bank of the
Mississippi river in the industrial corridor between
New Orleans and Baton Rouge, one might see a man
standing on the bank, fishing.  Immediately across
from him is a factory with a huge outfall pipe
belching effluent into the river.  The smell is intense,
stinging the eyes, but the man continues to fish.  He
will take the catch home to his family.  It is their
primary source of protein.2
Another:  In Pennsylvania, one might see a small
community ringed by large facilities.  The newest is a
medical and municipal waste incinerator.  Huge
trucks roll by, an average of  one every few minutes.
They shake the foundations of the houses and other
buildings; indeed, a nearby church is crumbling.  The
smells are terrible, and rodents are a big problem.3
These are classic real life environmental justice
scenarios.
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But sometimes environmental justice issues are
not readily apparent.  Imagine a school yard that
looks typical, even idyllic, in the sunny southern
California landscape, with no big imposing facilities
in sight.  But a community organizer explains that
there are high rates of leukemia and rare cancers
among the children.  He explains that many of the
school teachers have had multiple miscarriages and
that there have been a significant number of birth
defects among the faculty and staff at the school.  He
points to what he believes is the culprit: the vent of a
small metal plating shop next door.  The emissions
vent directly into the school yard.4
Similarly, in a community near Tucson, you see
another school yard.  In the middle of it is a garden
memorial to the children who have died.  In this case,
contaminated water is thought to be responsible.5
When encountering instances of environmental
injustice, one sees a range from the obvious to the
invisible.  There are quality of life impacts (noise,
odors, rodents) and serious adverse health impacts
(cancer clusters and exceedingly high rates of
respiratory diseases) in all kinds of  combinations.
Such scenarios illustrate the persistent failure of
environmental laws to protect certain populations.
And as the examples and the data pile up, what
becomes apparent is that the failure is not random.
People of color and the poor disproportionately live
in the communities that are overburdened by
pollution and underprotected by industry and
government.
This white paper describes briefly the remarkable
journey of community-based environmental justice
advocates over the last 15 years and their impact on
environmental regulation.  It will also describe some
of the empirical evidence of disparities and the
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regulatory dynamics that make these inequities an
intractable problem, despite the collective efforts of
grassroots leaders, environmental justice
organizations, public interest law firms, and
governmental officials.  The paper then focuses on
one important set of issues that must be tackled in
order to achieve environmental justice:  those
involving injustice in risk regulation.  These are by no
means the only issues that confront environmental
justice communities and
their advocates, who must
navigate a technocratic
regulatory arena despite a
persistent lack of resources,
language barriers, lack of
notice, and other
impediments to fair process.
They confront a wide range
of  issues.  Risk is a
significant one, to be sure,
but so are other quality of
life impacts, lack of
enforcement, destruction of
sacred sites, and lack of
access to such environmental amenities as parks,
open space, and beach access.
While the Center for Progressive Regulation does
not purport to speak for or on behalf of such
impacted communities, we strive in this white paper,
as allies in this collective undertaking, to analyze and
discuss some of the troubling regulatory processes
and methodologies that bedevil attempts to reduce
risk and eliminate disparities.  We close with seven
recommendations for agencies.  While this list is by no
means exhaustive, it includes steps that, taken
together, agencies should undertake to begin to
respond to environmental injustice.  We stress also
the need for any response to comport with the
Principles of  Environmental Justice6 and to provide for
full, meaningful participation by impacted
communities and consultation with affected tribes.
II. History and Regulatory Responses
Broadly speaking, environmental justice refers to a
political and social movement to address the disparate
distribution of  environmental harms and benefits in
society and to reform the processes of  environmental
decision making so that all affected communities have
a right to meaningful participation.
Some place the beginnings of the present day
environmental justice movement at the 1982
demonstration against the siting of a landfill for
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) near an African-
American community in
Warren County, North
Carolina.  Environmental
justice advocates place the
beginning as early as the
1964 passage of the Civil
Rights Act,7 or in 1971,
when an annual report by
the Council of
Environmental Quality
acknowledged that racial
discrimination adversely
affects the urban poor and
the quality of their
environment.  Local in
origin, the movement grew to national prominence in
the late 1980s and early 1990s as regional
environmental justice networks grew from local
organizations, the empirical evidence of
environmental injustice mounted, and activists came
together in 1991 for the First National People of
Color Leadership Summit.  The last 15 years in
particular have seen remarkable changes in the
landscape of environmental regulation in response to
environmental justice claims and the empirical
evidence that supported them.
In 1993, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) established the 25-
member National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (“NEJAC”) to make recommendations to the
EPA Administrator on environmental justice matters.
The NEJAC has since issued several reports and
recommendations.8  In February of  1994, then-
President Clinton signed the Executive Order on
Environmental Justice, which directed all federal
agencies to make achieving environmental justice part
of  their missions.9  In 2001, a group of  law professors
The last 15 years in particular
have seen remarkable changes in
the landscape of environmental
regulation in response to
environmental justice claims and
the empirical evidence that
supported them.
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surveyed several agencies to determine what actions
they had undertaken in response to the Executive
Order and to offer a preliminary assessment of their
compliance.10   The survey found that all agencies had
an initial outburst of  energy upon issuance of  the
Executive Order, but that carry-through was
inconsistent among agencies.  What seemed to
determine relative success was the level of
commitment of high-level officials within the agency
and a more centralized agency structure.
The Executive Order also created the Federal
Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice
(“IWG”), a group chaired by the EPA Administrator.
In 1999 the IWG established an Integrated Federal
Interagency Action Agenda, a vehicle that sponsored
a number of demonstration projects to promote
environmental justice.  These pilot projects have been
used to further develop alternative collaborative
approaches to achieving environmental justice.  They
have often involved efforts by federal and sub-federal
agencies and tribal governments working with
business stakeholders and community residents.  The
projects have included a range of issues, from
environmental cleanup of contaminated properties,
public health issues, children’s health concerns,
economic development, and capacity building.
Despite these initiatives, however, EPA has made
slow progress in implementing environmental justice,
as noted in a recent report by the EPA’s Office of  the
Inspector General.  That report concluded that the
EPA has yet to identify minority and low-income
populations or develop criteria for determining
disproportionate impact; has not developed a clear
vision or comprehensive strategic plan to address
environmental justice; has not established values,
goals, expectations, and performance measures; and
has not consistently implemented environmental
justice in EPA’s regional offices.11
Meanwhile, because of the lack of progress in
alleviating dire conditions in impacted communities,
environmental justice advocates began in the early
1990s to use environmental citizen suits,
constitutional claims, common law actions, and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to attempt to
remedy environmental disparities.  Section 602 of
Title VI authorizes federal agencies to adopt
regulations that prohibit recipients of federal funds
from discriminating either intentionally or by using a
facially neutral policy, procedure, or practice that has
a discriminatory impact on members of a protected
class.  Most of  the claims consisted of  a lawsuit or
administrative complaint to the EPA against state
environmental protection agencies that were allegedly
issuing permits to polluting facilities that resulted in
disparate impacts in people of  color communities.
Although Title VI does not explicitly grant a private
cause of action in the statute, most federal courts had
acknowledged such a right and allowed plaintiffs
access to the courts to prosecute Title VI violations
and seek injunctive relief.  However, in 2001, the
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval ruled that
disparate impact lawsuits under Section 602 could not
be brought directly by private citizens and that
citizens only had standing to sue for intentional
discrimination under Section 601.12  Instead, private
citizens alleging disparate impact could send a
complaint to a federal agency that funded the
recipient who was allegedly discriminating.  The
funding agency could launch an investigation and, if a
violation of their disparate impact regulations was
found and not remedied, the federal agency could
terminate funding of  the discriminating recipient.13
This makes administrative actions, i.e., complaints
filed with the EPA or other federal funding agencies,
the primary remedy for Title VI violations.  Recently,
the Office of  the General Council of  the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights released a report on Title
VI and the Executive Order on Environmental
Justice.  The report concluded that the significant
delay in the EPA’s issuance of  final guidance to
investigate such claims and the procedural delay in
investigating and ruling on such complaints have left
communities continually exposed to harmful
pollutants.14
According to EPA’s Title VI website, last updated
November 21, 2003, about 143 complaints have been
filed.  Eight of those cases have been decided on the
merits, but all were dismissed, six finding no adverse
impact, one finding no disparity, and one finding lack
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In 1987, the United Church of
Christ’s Commission for Racial
Justice released a national study
documenting a significant
relationship between the location
of commercial hazardous waste
facilities and uncontrolled toxic
waste sites and race.
of intentional discrimination.15  Thus, of the 143
complaints filed since September of 1993, there has
not been a formal finding of  a disparate impact in any
case, and EPA’s resolve either to terminate funding or
to refer cases to the Department of Justice for
enforcement remains untested.
Just as Title VI has been an illusory legal remedy
to redress environmental inequities, other legal tools
have been similarly disappointing.  Constitutional
claims alleging violations of the Equal Protection
Clause have been largely unsuccessful because of the
high evidentiary burden to prove discriminatory
intent.16  Standing requirements typically preclude
citizens from prosecuting
public nuisance actions.17
Toxic tort cases can be
difficult to prove because
the conditions in impacted
communities often stem
from a variety of sources,
making litigation against any
particular defendant
problematic.
Because of the difficulty
in making significant
progress at the national level
and in the courts, many
advocates are turning their
attention to state and local approaches.18  Initiatives
adopted include state executive orders, the
establishment of an environmental justice office or an
environmental justice position, policies or strategic
plans, environmental justice advisory boards
(statewide or community), and working groups
(agency or interagency).  Cleanup requirements for
contaminated sites and brownfield initiatives also
sometimes contain environmental justice provisions,
as do the criteria for approval of supplemental
environmental projects. Some states have taken
relatively aggressive steps and targeted enforcement
actions in impacted communities. These initiatives
demonstrate that environmental justice has grabbed
the attention of policymakers; however, these state
and local initiatives are of recent vintage, and any
assessment of their efficacy is premature.
III. The Evidence
The movement for environmental justice has been
bolstered by a solid body of empirical evidence
documenting that environmental harms and benefits
are unequally distributed in society.
Some of the best publicized early research focused
on hazardous waste facilities.  In 1983, for example,
the General Accounting Office (since renamed the
Government Accountability Office) found that three
of the four major offsite hazardous waste facilities in
EPA’s Region IV were located in predominantly
African-American communities, even though African-
Americans comprised only
about one-fifth of the
region’s population.19
Then in 1987, the
United Church of  Christ’s
Commission for Racial
Justice released a national
study documenting a
significant relationship
between the location of
commercial hazardous
waste facilities and
uncontrolled toxic waste
sites and race.  Although
socioeconomic status
appeared to play an important role in the location of
hazardous waste facilities, race was even more
significant, even after controlling for urbanization and
regional differences.20  Later research largely has
confirmed these results, although some studies have
reached differing conclusions.21
Other early research, some dating back to the start
of the 1970s, documented that air pollution and other
environmental hazards are distributed unequally by
race and income (and that in most cases race was
more strongly related to the incidence of pollution
than income).22  Based on its review of the literature,
in 1992 EPA concluded that racial minority and low-
income populations experience higher than average
exposures to certain air pollutants, hazardous waste
facilities (and by implication, hazardous waste),
Environmental Justice
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contaminated fish, and agricultural pesticides, and
that children of color suffer higher rates of lead
poisoning.23 (While blood lead levels of  children
continue to drop nationwide, children from poor
families remain eight times more likely to be poisoned
than those from higher-income families, and African-
American children are still five times more likely to be
poisoned than white children.24)
One response by academics to this evidence was
to raise the question, termed by Professor Robert
Bullard the “chicken or egg” debate, about whether
the polluting facilities were initially placed in people
of color communities or whether they were sited in a
more racially neutral manner, but post-siting market
forces caused the present disparities.25  The latter
“market dynamics” or “minority move-in”  theory
posits that the presence of polluting facilities reduced
land prices, thus prompting white residents to move
away and poorer people and minorities to move into
the area.  Based on the research to date, however,
there is little empirical support for the market
dynamics theory.  For example, a nationwide study by
Professor Vicki Been – one of the leading proponents
of this theory – found that in more than 500 of the
communities that hosted commercial hazardous waste
facilities at the time of  the study, neighborhoods
surrounding hazardous waste facilities did not become
poorer or more heavily minority after the facilities
were sited there.26
Other critics challenged the early studies as
inconclusive because they failed to clarify the
independent effects of race, income, population
density, and other demographic and political factors.
Since 1992, however, research has tended to be more
sophisticated and controlled for these variables.
These more recent studies in large part confirm the
earlier conclusions, finding that race and class are
significant predictors of  where environmental harms
are located, while also finding that other factors can
be significant predictors.27  Professors John Hird and
Michael Reese, for example, found a clear and strong
relationship between race and environmental quality
after examining 29 indicators of environmental
quality throughout the nation, including industrial air
emissions, industrial water discharges, water quality,
air quality, and proximity to hazardous wastes:
nonwhite and Hispanic populations experience
disproportionately high pollution levels.28  Scholars
James Lester, David Allen, and Kelly Hill reached
similar conclusions in their own detailed study of
where environmental harms are concentrated at the
state, county, and city levels.29
Interestingly, several studies show that the very
poorest neighborhoods appear to repel, rather than
attract polluting facilities, and that working class or
lower middle class neighborhoods bear a
disproportionate share of  such plants.30  A more
recent study in southern California also suggests a
more complicated picture, revealing that the
communities most likely to host risk-producing land
practices are communities experiencing an “ethnic
shift” from one ethnic minority to another.31  These
researchers posit that social ties are weakened in
communities undergoing transition and that they are
less likely to organize.32
Occupational hazards also are disproportionately
borne by low-income workers and workers of  color.
One notable example is farm worker exposure to
pesticides: 90 percent of the approximately 2 million
hired farm workers in the United States are people of
color.33  The World Resources Institute has estimated
that as many as 313,000 farm workers in the United
States may suffer from pesticide-related illnesses each
year.34  Outside the farm worker context, several
studies show that workers of color and low-wage
workers are more likely than the rest of the
population to work in jobs with higher exposures to
toxic chemicals and other hazardous conditions, and
that they experience greater risks of occupational
disease and injury.35
A smaller but growing body of evidence
demonstrates the uneven distribution of
environmental amenities, such as effective
enforcement, parks and open space, beach access, and
transportation spending.  Examples include:
Environmental Enforcement.  Low-income
communities and communities of color suffer
disproportionately when environmental laws are
The Center for Progressive Regulation
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inadequately enforced and businesses violate
requirements, because these communities host a
disproportionate share of  polluting facilities.  A 1992
study by the National Law Journal (“NLJ”) found that
penalties imposed by EPA for violations of  federal
environmental laws were substantially lower in
minority communities than in white communities, and
that racial disparities were evident in EPA’s response
to contaminated waste sites.36 (The NLJ study has
been criticized, and two subsequent studies of the
cases reviewed by the NLJ have questioned its
conclusions; two subsequent state studies, however,
report similar results.)
Parks and Open Space.  Newer studies are
documenting disparities in parks and open space.  Los
Angeles has fewer acres of parks per 1,000 residents
than any major city in the country; in the inner city
where low income communities of color live, there
are 0.3 acres of parks per thousand residents,
compared to 1.7 acres in disproportionately white and
relatively wealthy parts of  Los Angeles.37
Communities of  color in New York have the lowest
percentages of  tree canopy in the city, and New York
City has the lowest open space standards for its
citizens of any metropolitan area in the country –
only 2.5 acres of  open space per 1,000 residents.
Moreover, at least two-thirds of the community-
planning districts (primarily communities of color) do
not meet this standard.38
IV. The Many Regulatory Contexts in Which
Environmental Justice Issues Arise
Environmental justice advocates have explained
how and why disparities exist throughout the
regulatory process – in program design, standard
setting, permit issuance, enforcement, and cleanup of
contaminated properties.  Of  these, permit issuance is
perhaps the most recognized context in which
environmental justice issues arise.  As noted above,
much of the empirical evidence has documented the
maldistribution of hazardous waste and other
polluting facilities permitted by government agencies.
However, environmental injustice may result not only
from permitting decisions, but from other facets of
health and environmental agencies’ regulatory
approaches as well. Indeed, it would be a mistake to
think of “environmental justice” as encompassing
only issues of  facility siting and permitting.
Environmental justice protections are often absent
from the design of regulatory programs in the first
place.  For example, newer market-oriented programs
have been allowed to go forward despite the potential
for aggregate trades to result in toxic “hot spots” that
occur in minority communities.  A case in Southern
California is illustrative, where under a car-scrapping
program, refineries were allowed to buy reduction
credits by retiring heavily polluting older cars, in lieu
of installing vapor recovery systems at their marine
terminals.  The three refineries purchasing the bulk of
the credits were located in predominantly Latino
communities; these communities continued to
experience the refinery’s impacts, while the benefits
from the car scrapping were felt throughout the larger
metropolitan area.39  Likewise, innovations in program
design tend to be industry friendly, with no
protections for their implementation in impacted
communities.  The recent changes to the New Source
Review requirements of the Clean Air Act are
illustrative.  EPA has allowed companies to select the
two-year period with the highest emissions out of the
last ten years to serve as the baseline for determining
whether improvements at existing facilities will be
deemed to increase emissions and so require installing
new pollution control equipment.  It has also tried to
expand greatly the roster of improvements that are
exempt from new pollution control requirements
because they are considered to be routine
maintenance.  Both actions work to the detriment of
the communities that often host the older major
emitting facilities that will take advantage of the new
rules and increase emissions without undergoing New
Source Review.  To the extent that these host
communities are disproportionately comprised of
people of color and low-income people, the changes
impose a greater burden on these groups than on the
general population.
Environmental justice issues also surface in
environmental agencies’ standard setting efforts.  For
example, when agencies set standards to determine
the amount of  contamination they will permit to be
Environmental Justice
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By far the greatest number of
environmental justice challenges arise
in the course of permit proceedings.
Community residents in overburdened
communities, already beset by health
problems and a tenuous quality of life,
often view a new or expanded facility
as the proverbial straw that
breaks the camel’s back.
discharged into the air, water, or soils, they make a
host of assumptions about human exposure to the
contaminants.  Environmental justice advocates have
pointed out that these assumptions often do not
accurately describe the
more dire circumstances
of those who live in the
shadow of multiple
polluting facilities or who
consume much more fish
than the “average
American.”  When
agencies’ assumptions
underestimate the true
exposure of those
affected, the resulting
standards will not
adequately protect these
individuals.  These and
other issues in the
standard setting context are explored in greater detail
in Part V, which focuses on risk regulation.
By far the greatest number of environmental
justice challenges arise in the course of  permit
proceedings.  Community residents in overburdened
communities, already beset by health problems and a
tenuous quality of life, often view a new or expanded
facility as the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s
back.  Add to those concerns suspicions of siting
decisions motivated by racial discrimination, and the
result is often an aggressive and acrimonious
proceeding that is inefficient and unsatisfactory by
any measure.  Just as often, the permitting official is
left in a quandary about what she or he can and
cannot do to address environmental justice concerns.
There has been significant attention to potential legal
authorities to address environmental justice under
federal law.  The consensus of  commentators is that
there is ample discretionary authority for agencies to
address environmental justice concerns in more
broadly worded provisions or “omnibus” clauses that
can be found in most if  not all permitting statutes.40
However, to date, permitting authorities have been
exceedingly conservative in interpreting their
authority to address environmental justice concerns.
This stands in stark contrast to the very aggressive
use of  this authority to allow for streamlined permits,
flexible permitting, plant-wide applicability limits, and
other innovative favorable regulatory treatment at the
behest of  permit applicants.41  As such, the legal
authority to address
environmental justice in
permit proceedings
remains untried and
legally untested.
There are
documented disparities
in the cleanup of
contaminated properties
as well. Although the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and
Liability Act
(“CERCLA”) statutorily establishes a preference for
remedial actions at Superfund sites that permanently
and significantly reduce the volume, toxicity, or
mobility of the hazardous substances, a 1992 NLJ
investigation found that site capping was the
preferred cleanup method 7 percent more frequently
at predominantly minority sites compared to
predominantly white sites.  In contrast, soil treatment
was the preferred cleanup method 22 percent more
frequently at predominantly white sites compared to
predominantly minority sites.42  It also found that
Superfund site cleanups under CERCLA began 12
percent to 42 percent later at minority sites than
white sites.  The reason for the disparity may lie in
part in the inability of affected communities to
participate in the cleanup proceedings.  Although
EPA is authorized to provide technical assistance
grants (“TAG”) to communities impacted by a
Superfund site, many environmental justice advocates
view the TAG grants as having limited effect because
the administrative barriers limit the number of
communities that receive the grants and prevent them
from using the grants effectively.43
These barriers tend to exacerbate the issues that
arise in the selection of an appropriate remedy and
appropriate cleanup standards.  In addition, relocation
The Center for Progressive Regulation
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of residents of contaminated areas as an option poses
a unique set of issues because of the displacement of
sometimes stable people of  color communities.  In
addition, the payment for properties in affected
communities might have an artificially lower market
value because of perceived contamination and
because of the way that discrimination affects the
housing market generally.44
At times, the relocation
decisions in communities
of color have appeared
discriminatory when
compared to relocation in
white or wealthier areas.45
Aside from CERCLA
cleanups, the 1992 NLJ
investigative report also
found significant disparities
in federal enforcement of other environmental laws,
as discussed earlier.  The findings of  this study
resonated with many environmental justice advocates
who for years had heard and experienced anecdotal
accounts of lax governmental enforcement in people
of  color communities.46   The EPA disputed the
charges of  discrimination revealed by the NLJ study,
while acknowledging that there was a perception of
agency bias that needed to be addressed.  However, it
is not simply a matter of perception.  Even if
enforcement decisions are completely neutral,
unequal environmental burdens can nonetheless exist
simply because there are more polluting facilities and
other risk-producing land practices in people of color
communities.  Thus, an equal rate of  noncompliance
is certain to affect these impacted communities to a
greater extent.  This is troubling, considering that
noncompliance is widespread.  Numerous government
reports indicate that rates of significant
noncompliance by major facilities with federal
environmental requirements are in the range of 20 to
40 percent.  Also of concern is that enforcement
decisions – such as when to inspect, whether to
prosecute, and how to settle an enforcement action –
are ordinarily decisions made away from public
scrutiny and discretionary matters not typically
subject to judicial review.  Decision makers exercising
such wide-ranging discretion may, consciously or
unintentionally, act on biases that disadvantage poor
and people of  color communities.
Finally, the shift in emphasis at the state level in
recent years from deterrence-based models of
enforcement to cooperation-based enforcement
strategies may have adverse impacts on heavily
burdened communities. For
example, state-level
inspections and other
traditional enforcement
activity dropped during the
late 1990s. Likewise, other
cooperative-based strategies
pursued by states – such as
amnesty programs,
environmental audit
privilege and immunity laws,
and flexible penalty policies
– can weaken traditional enforcement and add to real
or perceived disparities.
While environmental justice advocates have begun
to bring these various aspects of environmental
injustice to the attention of agency regulators, there
are several obstacles that preclude effective and
protective regulation from becoming a reality.  First,
environmental justice groups often lack the capacity –
time, money, and expertise – to participate
meaningfully in regulatory processes, from permit
proceedings to advisory groups.   Another problem is
the current patchwork of local, state, and federal
regulations that address environmental problems.
This fractured legal jurisdiction makes it difficult for
residents in highly impacted communities to reach the
right decision makers, at the right time, in the
appropriate venue.  Even in instances where an
agency clearly has the authority over an issue, the
tendency is to shift an environmental justice problem
to another site of  regulatory activity.  For example,
when environmental justice advocates have requested
environmental protections in proposed regulations,
agencies have responded by noting that such issues
are best addressed on a case-by-case basis, such as in
a permit proceeding.  Then in permit proceedings, the
hearing officer explains that he or she has no authority
to address environmental justice because the
The shift in emphasis at the state
level in recent years from
deterrence-based models of
enforcement to cooperation-based
enforcement strategies may have
adverse impacts on heavily
burdened communities.
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regulations are silent on the matter, or that such
matters are best suited to enforcement actions.
Even this brief sketch affords a sense of the many
and varied regulatory contexts in which
environmental justice issues arise.  In the next Part,
we focus on one subset of these issues: occasions for
injustice in risk regulation.
V.  Injustice in Risk Regulation
From the perspective of  those affected, the harms
of contaminated environments are many and
interrelated.  These harms include adverse impacts on
ecological health and to humans’ physical,
psychological, social, and cultural health.  In many
instances, the affront is not only to an individual, but
also to a group.  These harms, moreover, are the
result of multiple contributing “stressors” – for
example, the likely adverse impact of exposure to a
chemical stressor such as mercury (present in fish that
live in contaminated aquatic environments) depends
in part on the presence of other chemical stressors
such as PCBs and socioeconomic stressors such as
lack of access to adequate health care.
When health and environmental agencies respond
to the harms of  contaminated environments,
however, they typically focus on risk to human health
– understood in the narrow, individual physiological
sense of  the term.  Agencies proceed chemical by
chemical (or source by source) and consider the
extent to which human contact with that chemical is
likely to result in an increase in the occurrence of
various human health “endpoints” such as
neurological damage or cancer. Agencies generally
make this determination by means of  risk assessment,
an analytical tool that produces a quantitative
prediction of this increase for given levels of
environmental contamination.  In setting water
quality standards, for example, agencies employ risk
assessment to set standards for dioxins that are
designed to permit discharges to surface waters just
up to the level that results in an increased risk of
cancer deemed “acceptable.”  In this process, agency
risk assessors take into account the toxicity of the
contaminant in question (are dioxins potent
carcinogens?) together with the various factors that
describe human exposure to that contaminant (once
present in aquatic environments, do dioxins
bioaccumulate in fish?  do humans consume these fish
and, if  so, in what quantity?  over what period?).
Health and environmental agencies then “manage”
these human health risks by one or both of two
strategies.  The first strategy is risk reduction, whereby
risk producers are required to clean up, reduce, or
prevent environmental contamination; for example,
through effluent limitations, applied to industrial
sources that discharge contaminants into nearby
surface waters.  The second strategy is risk avoidance,
whereby risk bearers are asked to change the practices
that expose them to contamination so as to avoid the
resulting risk; for example, through fish consumption
advisories directing people to reduce or eliminate
certain species of fish from their diet.
As persuasively argued by environmental justice
advocates, there are numerous limitations in how
agencies evaluate and respond to environmental
contamination.  First and fundamentally, agencies’
narrow focus on human health risk misunderstands
the nature of  the harm from the perspective of  many
of those affected.  Second, working within this more
narrowly framed inquiry, agencies’ assessment of
exposure often fails accurately to reflect the actual
circumstances of tribes and other indigenous peoples,
other communities of color, and low-income
communities.  Third, agencies’ “toxicity times
exposure” formula for assessing risk fails to register
the effects of multiple stressors, such that an
environmental insult of the same intensity may result
in widely differing effects for two different
communities or subpopulations.  Fourth, agencies’
increasing reliance on risk avoidance rather than risk
reduction in their efforts to address environmental
contamination disproportionately burdens
environmental justice groups.  The NEJAC, a multi-
stakeholder advisory group discussed above, has
made similar observations about agencies’ risk
assessment and risk management processes.  We
highlight below the issues of  exposure, vulnerability,
and risk avoidance.
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A.  Exposure
Humans are exposed to environmental
contaminants through various pathways: we inhale
toxic air contaminants, we drink contaminated
groundwater, we absorb pesticides through our skin,
and we eat fish that bioaccumulate toxins from
contaminated surface water and sediments.  In the
case of mercury and PCBs, for example, fish
consumption is the primary route of human exposure.
Factors relevant to human exposure include, among
other things, the quantity of fish people consume, the
frequency of fish consumption, the species and parts
of the fish people typically eat, the preparation
methods they use, and the bodyweight of those
exposed.  In gathering information about exposure to
environmental contaminants, agencies for the most
part consider the lives, practices, and circumstances
of  the “average American” or the “typical U.S.
consumer.”  Yet humans’ fish consumption practices
vary considerably.  Agencies have tended not to
account for this variability and, importantly, not to
register the cultural, traditional, religious, historical,
economic, and legal circumstances that are relevant
when tribes and other indigenous peoples,
communities of color, and low-income communities
are among those exposed.
The EPA’s proposed regulation of  mercury emitted
from coal-fired power plants provides a case in
point.47  In the preamble announcing the rule, EPA
emphasizes that the “typical U.S. consumer eating a
wide variety of fish from restaurants and grocery
stores is not in danger of  consuming harmful levels of
methylmercury from fish and is not advised to limit
fish consumption.”48  Those who “regularly and
frequently consume large amounts of  fish,” the EPA
concedes, “are more exposed.”49  In developing its
rule, EPA considered studies tabulating fish
consumption rates for the general population as well
as for various “subsistence” populations.50  The fish
consumption rate currently recommended by EPA as
a default for use in setting water quality standards for
the general population is 17.5 grams/day (roughly one
fish meal every two weeks).  The default for
subsistence populations is 142.4 grams/day.  In fact,
fish consumption rates for some groups may well be
markedly greater than even this value for subsistence
fishers.  This is likely the case, for example, for
members of the various Ojibwe tribes of the Great
Lakes.  A survey of  tribal spearers conducted by the
Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission
(GLIFWC) found that those consuming an average
number of walleye meals in spring (the season of
highest consumption) had intake rates ranging from
189.6 grams/day to 393.8 grams/day.51
Additionally, methylmercury’s particular health
endpoints mean that relatively short periods of
consumption – corresponding to developmental
periods during which methylmercury is likely to
damage the developing nervous system of  the fetus or
growing child – can contribute to health effects.52  As
a consequence, monthly or seasonal consumption
patterns become important in evaluating the harms
from methylmercury exposure.  Whereas there is little
seasonal fluctuation in fish intake for members of the
general population, this fluctuation is marked for
Ojibwe tribal spearers.  The average number of  meals
of walleye consumed ranges from a low of 2.2 meals
per week in the fall to a high of 3.6 meals per week in
the spring.53
  Moreover, seasonal and cultural constraints (for
example, consumption as part of ceremonies or
traditional gatherings) affect tribal consumption in
ways that do not affect most members of the general
population.  Further, even the size of the average
meal may differ considerably among different
subpopulations – whereas the EPA assumes that the
average meal size for a fish consumer in the general
U.S. population is 6 ounces (approximately 170
grams), the GLIFWC survey revealed that the average
size of a fish meal for tribal fishers ranged from 13 to
27 ounces (approximately 369 to 766 grams).54  It is
not only how much fish is consumed, but also how
frequently and at what point in one’s life this fish is
consumed that is relevant to exposure.
Finally, because the concentration of
methylmercury present in fish tissue differs from
species to species, and from fish to fish within a
particular species, different groups’ fish consumption
practices again contribute to differences in exposure.
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Many of the species that are most frequently
consumed by the general population in the United
States. (e.g., Alaskan pollack, salmon, crab, and cod)
are contaminated to a far lesser degree than those
species most frequently consumed by GLIFWC tribal
members (e.g., walleye, muskellunge, northern pike,
and lake trout).55
As a result, members of the various Ojibwe tribes
in the Great Lakes are more highly exposed than the
members of the general population that are the
apparent focus of  EPA’s regulatory efforts for
mercury.56  In fact, given current levels of
contamination in walleye, a woman consuming at
rates typical of  the general U.S. population is currently
exposed to methylmercury just at the EPA’s reference
dose (RfD) – the level above which exposure is
unsafe for humans.57  But a woman consuming at rates
typical of the general population in the Great Lakes
states is exposed at levels over twice the EPA’s RfD.58
And a woman consuming at rates typical of GLIFWC
tribal fishers is currently exposed at levels more than
ten times the EPA’s threshold.59  Thus, the level set by
EPA’s proposed mercury rule leaves many in the
Great Lakes region unprotected, and it imposes the
most severe burden on the fishing tribes and their
members.
The case of worker protection standards set by
EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide &
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in 1992 provides another
example.60 Those standards contain entry intervals,
provisions that require a waiting period between
pesticide application and worker reentry into the
fields.  The longer the entry interval, the more
protective it is for the farm worker, but it is also more
economically burdensome upon the grower, who must
wait longer to harvest in the area of  the application
and pesticide drift.  In developing the entry intervals,
the EPA claimed that the standards take into account
twelve-year-old workers, the youngest legal workers
in the field.  However, the General Accounting Office
issued a report, based upon interviews with EPA
personnel, that disclosed that the default body weight
used in calculating the entry intervals was 154
pounds.61  Yet, the median weight of  twelve-year-olds
is 100 pounds.  The EPA justified its failure to use the
more accurate, and protective, assumption of 100
pounds by reasoning that although twelve-year-olds
were on average 100 pounds, their bodies have less
surface area, and they perform less work, resulting in
less physical contact with pesticide-treated plants.
This justification flies in the face of the fact that,
pound for pound, children eat more and breathe more
than adults, and so are more exposed to pesticides via
ingestion and inhalation.  In addition, children’s
ordinary behaviors result in greater exposures than
adults:  among other things, their greater hand-to-
mouth contact means that they are more likely to
come in contact with pesticides transferred from
objects, soil, or dust.  Additionally, EPA’s failure to
account for children below the age of twelve is
problematic considering the fact, known to the EPA,
that farm worker parents often take their preschool
children (some of them infants) into the fields with
them due to lack of  day care services.  The
implications of  EPA’s choice come into focus when
one considers that the vast majority – 88 percent – of
farm workers are Latinos.62  This demographic group
is overwhelmingly low-income, with very low
educational attainment and few health care
opportunities.
Although the issue of differential exposure
circumstances has been acknowledged by agencies,
they have to date taken few concrete steps to adopt
environmental standards that take into account these
exposure patterns and are protective of the practices
and lifeways of  heavily impacted communities.
B.  Vulnerability
In addition to exposure, several other factors are
relevant to assessing the likelihood of adverse effects
from contact with environmental contamination.  As
long maintained by affected communities, agencies’
focus on a single chemical or source (for example, “a
risk assessment for dioxin,” “a cleanup standard for
TCE in the groundwater”) is misplaced.  Rather than
starting with a single chemical stressor and following
it to the exposed community, agencies should follow
an analysis that takes as its starting point a
subpopulation or place and considers the multiple
The Center for Progressive Regulation
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chemical and non-chemical stressors that affect that
subpopulation or place. This broader, contextualized
understanding of the nature of the problem is
sometimes discussed in terms of  groups’ differing
susceptibilities,63 the presence of “co-risk” factors,64
or cumulative risks.  As the NEJAC recently
recognized, however, usage here has been
inconsistent.65  Thus, it adopts the helpful term
“vulnerability,” a concept that includes an individual’s
susceptibility or sensitivity to the contaminant(s) in
question; her circumstances of exposure to the
contaminant(s); and her ability to prepare for and
recover from the effects of contact with the
contaminant(s), given the various other chemical and
non-chemical stressors (for example, physical, social,
cultural) that affect that individual.66
Differential Susceptibility or Sensitivity.  A
subpopulation may be more susceptible to a particular
environmental contaminant – that is, more likely to
suffer an adverse effect when exposed to a given level
or “dose” of a toxic contaminant – because of one or
more factors:  members’ life stages (for example, are
they children, pregnant women, or the elderly?), pre-
existing conditions (for example, do they have asthma
or an impaired immune system?), and genetic makeup
(for example, do they have genetic polymorphisms
that render them more susceptible to certain health
endpoints?).  A subpopulation may also be more or
less sensitive to a particular environmental
contaminant because of members’ previous exposures
to the same or similar contaminants, such that they
have become sensitized and now have more severe
responses.  It seems clear that there is a significant
correlation between race, ethnicity, and income and
some of these factors that affect susceptibility or
sensitivity.  For example, asthma disproportionately
affects African-Americans in the United States:
African-Americans visit the emergency room because
of asthma at three times the rate of whites; are
hospitalized for asthma at more than three times the
rate of whites; and die from asthma at two times the
rate of  whites.67
Differential Exposure.  A subpopulation may be
more vulnerable to a given level of environmental
contamination because its members’ circumstances
and lifeways leave them more exposed to the
contaminants than those in the general population.
They might live nearer to the fence line of industrial
facilities that emit multiple toxic air pollutants
(pollutants that may have cumulative or synergistic
effects, such that their effects are amplified or
multiplied beyond the additive effects of exposure to
each pollutant individually); they might live in older,
deteriorated housing that harbors lead dust; they
might depend on fish that has become contaminated
with PCBs.  A subpopulation may also be more
vulnerable because of historic or background
exposure.  Members may have been exposed in the
past or over time (including through occupational
exposure) such that their body burdens are already
relatively high and any additional exposure may place
them at risk of exceeding threshold safety levels for
humans.  Examples are numerous.  Whereas 68
percent of the African-American population lives
within 30 miles of a coal-fired power plant, where
they are exposed to sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
particulates and mercury, only 56 percent of  the white
population lives within this distance of a coal-fired
power plant.68  Whereas 15.3 percent of non-Hispanic
white women of childbearing age have mercury in
their blood at levels that pose a risk to a developing
fetus, this number climbs to 31.5 percent for women
of childbearing age who identify themselves as
“Other,” a category comprised primarily of  Native
Americans, Pacific Islanders, those “of  Asian origin,”
or those of  “mixed race.”69  Twice as many Hispanic
children as non-Hispanic white children have lead in
their blood above the action level established by the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention for risk of
lead poisoning.70  Hmong fishers along the Fox River
in Wisconsin not only consume fish at greater
quantities that the “average American,” but they
consume fish heavily contaminated with both PCBs
and methylmercury, contaminants researchers believe
may act in concert.71
Differential Preparedness or Ability to Recover.  A
subpopulation may be less able to withstand or
recover from an environmental insult or stressor.  This
may be so because the subpopulation lacks economic
means; has nutritional deficits; has poor access to
preventative and other health care (including, for
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example, vaccination, early diagnosis, adequate
treatment); has poor access to informational and
other preventative resources; or is relatively isolated
or lacks influence for linguistic, racial, economic, or
other reasons.  Again, the examples are numerous.
Nationally, American Indians and Alaska Natives
have the highest poverty rate – twice the national
average.72  Approximately 52 percent of Hispanics
under the age of 65 do not have health insurance and
Hispanics account for fully one-quarter of the
nation’s 74 million uninsured; these rates are even
higher if  one considers Spanish-speaking Hispanics.73
An assessment of  vulnerability, of  course, must
account for how these multiple and interrelated
factors work in concert to affect communities or
places.  One useful matrix for doing this has been
developed by the NEJAC.74  This sample matrix
gathers the factors relevant to assessing vulnerability
in the Mississippi River Industrial Corridor – also
known as “Cancer Alley” – the 2,000 square mile area
between Baton Rouge and New Orleans in the state
of Louisiana.
EPA’s current risk assessments largely ignore
considerations of vulnerability beyond exposure to
the single contaminant at issue.  EPA has, however,
Table developed by Ms. Wilma Subra,
Louisiana Environmental Action Network.
Table 1: Multiple, Aggregate, and Cumulative Risks and Impacts in the Mississippi River Industrial Corridor
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recently issued a Framework for Cumulative Risk
Assessment that incorporates a broad understanding of
vulnerability and of the stressors that are relevant to a
community- or place-based assessment of  the harms
of environmental contamination.75  If fully
implemented, the approach suggested in the
Framework could significantly improve the manner in
which risk assessments are carried out.
Finally, tribes have pointed out that there are
unique considerations that apply when tribal
resources are at stake.76  As suggested by the
discussion above, the various tribes and their
members have susceptibilities and sensitivities,
exposure circumstances, and abilities to prepare for
and recover from environmental insults that will often
differ from the general population and other
subpopulations, including, in some instances, other
tribal subpopulations.  In addition, it is crucial to note
that American Indian tribes and Alaska Native
villages have a unique political and legal status that
differentiates them from other affected groups.77
Tribes are sovereign nations, with broad inherent
authority over their members, territories, and
resources.  Tribes’ unique legal status includes a trust
responsibility on the part of the federal government78
and various commitments to maintain a government-
to-government relationship.  In many cases, tribal
rights and resources (including, for example, the rights
to catch and consume fish or to hunt certain animals)
are also protected by treaties.  Finally, tribes’ rights to
self-determination, including cultural self-
determination, may mean that appropriate risk
assessments need to take into account the unique
relationship between tribes and the traditional lands
and resources on which they depend.79  Typically, this
has not been done by agencies.
C.  Risk Avoidance
In responding to the harms of  environmental
contamination, the current Bush Administration has
embraced risk avoidance in lieu of risk reduction.80
Risk reduction strategies aim to clean up, limit, or
prevent environmental contamination in the first
place.  Risk avoidance strategies, by contrast, leave
contamination unabated.  They address the harms of
this contamination by looking to those whose
circumstances or lifeways leave them exposed and
asking them to alter their ways, thereby “avoiding”
the risk – placing the burden on victims rather than
polluters.  The proposed regulation of  mercury from
coal-fired power plants exemplifies just this shift.81
Rather than seek to reduce the risks to those who
“regularly and frequently consume large amounts of
fish” by decreasing the amount of mercury emitted
into the environment, it places responsibility on those
affected to avoid the risk by altering their fish-
consumption practices.  EPA instructs those affected,
particularly children and women of childbearing age,
to consult fish consumption advisories and reduce or
eliminate fish from their diets accordingly.
Remarkably, the EPA unflinchingly acknowledges
that it will be Native Americans, Southeast Asian
Americans, and lower income subsistence fishers who
will be subject to avoidance measures.
This turn to risk avoidance is problematic on
several scores and is particularly troubling from the
perspective of environmental justice.  First, risk
avoidance is short-sighted.82  By focusing only on
specific, direct threats to human health, risk
avoidance measures leave unaddressed the myriad
other effects of contamination, that is, the adverse
effects on all non-human components of  ecosystems.
Loons cannot read fish consumption advisories.  This
lack of concern for non-human health is troubling in
and of itself, for example, for the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, for whom loons, mink, and other
animals affected by methylmercury contamination are
important clan symbols and valued as parts of an
integrated ecosystem.  Even if one is concerned
chiefly with human health, however, risk avoidance
may fail ultimately to address many direct and indirect
effects on humans.  In the case of  mercury, for
example, there is evidence that methylmercury
contamination inhibits the growth of wild rice, a
staple food and culturally important resource for the
various Objibwe and other tribes.
Second, risk avoidance is often not effective.83  In
order for risk avoidance to work, advisories must be
received and understood, restrictions must be
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enforced, and human behaviors must be changed –
each of  which presents considerable hurdles.  These
hurdles loom larger and may become insurmountable
when those affected do not share the language or
culture of  the dominant population.  For example, a
recent study showed that half of those consuming
fish caught on the Great Lakes were unaware of the
relevant fish consumption advisories; people of color,
women, and those without a high school degree
evidenced the least awareness.  Those for whom fish
consumption includes spiritual, traditional, or cultural
dimensions may feel that it is simply not possible to
cease eating fish.  In the case of members of the
various Ojibwe tribes, for example, a recent survey
showed that whereas 57
percent of tribal fishers
were aware of mercury
advisories for walleye, only
9 percent had ever refused
to eat walleye in a group
setting such as a feast or a
ceremonial gathering.
Third, risk avoidance is
an approach with finite
possibilities.84  Some
pollutants can be more
readily avoided than others.
The options for avoiding
mercury in fish are few.  A
fisher seeking to avoid PCB
contamination might be able to alter his preparation
methods – trimming the skin and fat from fillets and
broiling or grilling so that the fats drips off while
cooking – but to continue to fish at his customary
sites and for his customary species.  A fisher seeking
to avoid mercury contamination, by contrast, cannot
do so merely by altering her preparation methods,
because methylmercury accumulates in the muscle
tissue that comprises the fillet.  Instead, she must take
steps to reduce – and, in some cases, eliminate
altogether – her total consumption of particular
species caught from contaminated waters and to pace
her allowable intake to avoid acute exposure.  As a
general matter, the more risk avoidance is allowed to
supplant risk reduction, the fewer the options for risk
avoidance.  Heavy reliance on risk avoidance would
eventually lead to a world in which there are no
longer any healthful alternatives, as uncontaminated
environments are permitted one by one to become
and remain degraded.   Eventually, if  mercury
emissions were to continue unabated, there would be
no “safe” species, no lakes free of contamination.
Fourth, risk avoidance may itself  introduce risks.85
If those exposed change their ways in order to avoid
risks posed by contamination, they may adopt
practices that subject them to a different set of  risks.
To the extent that those affected “comply” with fish
consumption advisories, the potential for
countervailing risks is a serious concern, given the
celebrated nutritional
benefits of frequent fish
consumption.  Fish are an
efficient source of protein,
omega-3 fatty acids,
selenium, and other
nutrients important to
human health.  By foregoing
these benefits, those
affected may open
themselves to an increased
risk of coronary and other
diseases.  In addition, for
those for whom fish forms a
part of a traditional diet,
including those in the
fishing tribes of the upper
Great Lakes, regular consumption of fish and other
traditional foods may function to promote health and
to combat diabetes, a particular concern for tribes
given the high rate of diabetes among American
Indians and Alaska Natives.86  Agencies may believe
themselves to have made informed choices and
tradeoffs before opting for risk avoidance.  As
elaborated below, however, such tradeoffs are likely
to reflect the values of the dominant society; this is
problematic to the extent that these values are
different from those on whom the burden of
undertaking risk avoidance will fall.  And the point
nonetheless remains that agency decision makers may
not foresee fully the roster of  countervailing risks
introduced by avoidance measures.
Finally, risk avoidance is
fundamentally unfair:  the burden
of undertaking risk avoidance
measures is likely to fall
disproportionately on tribes and
indigenous peoples, other
communities of color, and low-
income communities, because it is
these communities who are likely
to be among the most exposed.
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Finally, risk avoidance is fundamentally unfair:
the burden of undertaking risk avoidance measures is
likely to fall disproportionately on tribes and
indigenous peoples, other communities of color, and
low-income communities, because it is these
communities who are likely to be among the most
exposed.  In the case of mercury contamination,
whereas members of the general population,
especially those who do not consume fish, are not
much affected by a turn to advisories in lieu of
reduced contamination, members of these fishing
peoples will be faced with the “choice” of curtailing
severely their fish intake or being exposed to
methylmercury in fish at levels determined to be
unhealthful for humans.
Moreover, risk avoidance measures are likely to be
evaluated by reference to the understandings and
commitments of the dominant society and adopted
only where avoidance is thought not to occasion great
costs or profound loss.  Yet the understandings and
commitments of those who will be faced with altering
their practices and lifeways may be quite different
than those of  the dominant society.  This will often
be the case where Native peoples are prominent
among the risk bearers, as they are when the source
of risk is methylmercury contamination.  Thus,
environmental injustice here arises not only from
distributive inequities but also from cultural
discrimination.  Not only are the Ojibwe and other
fishing peoples the ones most heavily burdened by
reliance on fish consumption advisories, but they are
likely to understand differently the nature of this
burden.  There are likely profound differences in the
value attached to fish, fishing, and fish consumption
as between various indigenous peoples and the
dominant society.  For the fishing tribes of  the Great
Lakes, as for fishing peoples elsewhere, fish and the
lifeways associated with fish are central to their
identity as peoples; they are indispensable to physical,
social, economic, political, spiritual, and cultural
health.  For the dominant society, by contrast, these
practices, while important, are likely not constitutive
of  their very identity.  Thus, for example, a member
of the general population who habitually consumes
two meals of fish per week might, in the face of fish
consumption advisories for mercury, look to
substitute food sources with relatively modest
accommodations to palate and pocketbook.  A
member of the Mille Lacs Band, however, might view
such risk avoidance measures as impossible, given the
affront this would mean to her tribe’s very identity, to
what it means to be Ojibweg.   By permitting
significant mercury contamination to remain and
relying instead on fish consumption advisories, EPA
perpetuates a long history of cultural discrimination
against American Indian peoples.
VI. Recommendations
The following recommendations do not by any
means exhaust the possible efforts agencies might
usefully undertake to address the issues outlined
above.  But they represent important steps that, taken
together, would at least begin to address
environmental injustice.
1. Reduce Risk, Don’t Force the Public to Avoid
Risk
Agencies should stop using “risk avoidance”
strategies – those that require the public to avoid the
risks imposed on them rather than require firms
creating the hazards to reduce these risks – as a way
to control environmental and health risks. These
strategies fail to address the underlying risks posed by
harmful activities, are of  doubtful efficacy (they rely,
for example, on warnings about consuming
contaminated fish to be read and understood and to
change the behavior of subsistence anglers; or they
count on the construction of  a fence surrounding
contaminated soil to permanently keep children from
playing there), and tend to fall disproportionately on
Native Americans, racial minorities, and low-income
individuals who are the most highly exposed to
harmful pollutants.  Moreover, these strategies often
burden practices highly valued on cultural or spiritual
grounds only by indigenous peoples or other people
of color – such as fishing and fish consumption or
basket-weaving.   Rather than placing the burden on
innocent members of  the public – instructing children
to remain indoors during especially bad air days or
counseling anglers not to eat fish caught in waters
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contaminated by toxics – agencies should strive to
reduce or eliminate risk-generating activities.
2.  Prevent Pollution at the Source
Agencies must devote increasing attention to
preventing or reducing pollution at the source, rather
than controlling pollution after its creation at the “end
of the pipe.”  Chemical products and processes must
be redesigned to reduce or eliminate the use and
generation of  hazardous substances.  Pollution
prevention can reduce waste, save costs and increase
efficiency, and reduce risks to workers, the
environment, as well as the public – risks that are
disproportionately borne by low-income communities
and communities of  color.
Although most environmental laws currently do
not mandate pollution prevention, agencies can
nonetheless use the permitting and enforcement
processes to identify and implement source reduction
opportunities.  As noted above, it is the consensus of
commentators that ample discretionary authority
exists under most if not all of the relevant
environmental statutes.  Federal and state agencies
should make use of this authority to require
mitigation, to address cumulative impacts, or to deny
permits in cases where permit issuance would result
in a disparate impact in overburdened communities.
Moreover, as outlined in the NEJAC report, Advancing
Environmental Justice Through Pollution Prevention,
agencies should work with community residents in
areas with multiple sources of pollution to develop
comprehensive, community-wide toxics reduction
plans.  Additionally, states and localities should adopt
laws that require companies to analyze their use of
toxic chemicals and identify options for reducing use.
This approach in Massachusetts, in the form of  the
state’s Toxic Use Reduction Act, has been quite
successful at reducing toxic emissions.
3. More Systematically Analyze Cumulative Risks
Traditionally environmental agencies have
analyzed risks posed by polluting facilities or other
activities one at a time – chemical by chemical or
source by source, as if these risks occurred in
isolation.  As a result, many environmental decisions
have been made by agencies without consideration of
the multiple and varied stressors that affect the health
and well being of  impacted communities.
To the maximum extent permitted by their
discretionary authority, agencies should work to
incorporate cumulative risk analysis in their decision-
making process.  Moreover, as articulated in EPA’s
Framework on Cumulative Risk Assessment, agencies
should embrace a broad view of what constitutes
cumulative risk, including examining stressors beyond
those subject to their regulatory authority.   Risk
should be defined to include not just chemical
stressors but a range of other biological, physical,
social and cultural factors that affect the population
experiencing a risky activity – factors such as genetic
disposition, life stage, preexisting illnesses and
background health conditions, income level, access to
health care and health insurance, and historical and
background exposures.  Moreover, agencies should
draw on the knowledge and expertise of community
members and tribes in assessing the many factors that
may contribute to that group’s increased vulnerability
to risk-producing activities.
Related, in the context of Clean Air Act
permitting decisions, EPA and state agencies should
use their authority to require that proposed new or
expanded sources in heavily impacted areas conduct
“multi-source” modeling – modeling that analyzes not
only the source’s direct impacts but the combined
impacts of all existing sources in the area.  This will
allow agencies and the public to gauge more
accurately the cumulative air burdens facing
communities.
4. Implement a Community-Based Participatory
Research Model
EPA and other environmental agencies should
implement a community-based participatory research
model for conducting risk assessments, research, and
other investigations. This model promotes active
community or tribal involvement in the processes that
shape agency research and intervention strategies
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affecting local communities.  It helps ensure that risk
assessments are informed by local knowledge and
conditions, and that agency research questions are
guided by the environmental health issues and
concerns most important to community members or
tribes.
5. Adopt the Precautionary Principle
Agencies should embrace a precautionary
approach to dealing with risky activities – one that
calls for precautionary measures when an activity
raises potential threats to the environment or human
health, even if there is scientific uncertainty about
those impacts.  In such situations, the burden of
proving that an action is safe should be placed on the
party responsible for creating the risk, and a full range
of alternatives should be examined to see if there are
safer, less harmful options to the proposed activity.87
This principle has become a cornerstone of
international environmental law treaties,
environmental policies adopted by the European
Union, and local ordinances in several U.S.
communities, including Portland, Oregon and San
Francisco, California.
For example, although humans have introduced
tens of thousands of toxic chemicals into commerce
over the past several decades, agencies lack toxicity
information about the vast majority of  them.  To
remedy this large data gap, agencies should shift the
burden of proof to chemical producers to
demonstrate the safety of toxic chemicals – an
approach mandated by the European Union’s recent
REACH legislation.  Ultimately, a precautionary
approach will lead to reductions in risky activities –
activities that disproportionately burden poor,
minority, and indigenous populations.
6. ‘Nonattainment’ Areas for Toxic Releases
Many communities are saturated with multiple
sources of pollution or face high community health
burdens resulting from the cumulative combination of
multiple stressors. Just as new or expanding sources in
areas that fail to meet the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards of the Clean Air Act must offset
their increased pollution by eliminating a greater
amount of emissions in the area in order to allow
progress toward meeting the air quality standards,
agencies should pioneer the concept of
“nonattainment areas” for toxic emissions.  New
sources discharging toxic pollutants into an already
overburdened area should be required to mitigate
their harmful emissions by a greater amount of  the
new emissions, so as to help relieve the cumulative
burdens faced in these communities.  For their part,
agencies should require extra protections – in the way
of  buffer zones, tighter triggers for more
comprehensive analyses, or additional enforcement
scrutiny – in these overburdened communities.  The
South Coast Air Quality Management District in Los
Angeles, for instance, now requires buffer zones for
such sensitive receptors as schools to protect against
the risks posed by toxic emissions from chrome
plating and other high impact sources.
7.  Prevent Hot Spots in Pollution Trading
Programs
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in
emission trading and other market-based programs.
While in theory these programs can reduce overall
pollution levels more efficiently than certain forms of
traditional regulation, as discussed earlier, they also
have considerable potential to create or exacerbate
pollution “hot spots,” typically in low-income
communities or communities of  color.  Such
communities, for example, may host a
disproportionate share of older, inefficient facilities
that are likely to purchase emission reduction credits
from plants in other areas, rather than adopt on-site
pollution controls.
To prevent hot spots from developing,
environmental justice considerations should be
factored into the design of  market-based programs.
Thus, for example, decision makers (or trading
partners) should be required to analyze the potential
impact of emission trades on low-income
communities and communities of color before the
trades go forward.  In especially overburdened
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communities, trades should be prohibited absent
offsetting reductions of equal or greater amount in
that community.  Finally, trading in some instances
may simply not be appropriate.  This is likely to be
the case where the pollutants at issue have acute
impacts (e.g., many hazardous air pollutants) or where
inter-pollutant trading (i.e., trading of different
pollutants with diverse characteristics) is involved.
This is also the case where trading could perpetuate
or exacerbate inequities in environmental protection
(in the case of mercury emissions for coal-fired power
plants, for example).
The Center for Progressive Regulation has
elaborated on several of these recommendations in A
New Progressive Agenda for Public Health and the
Environment.88
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Conclusion
Environmental justice advocates have done much
in the past 15 years to focus the attention of agency
regulators and the public on the current
maldistribution of environmental burdens and
benefits.  While their efforts have resulted in an
enlarged understanding of the regulatory contexts in
which environmental justice issues arise, agency
decision makers have yet to undertake many of the
changes that would be necessary to begin to address
these issues.  We echo environmental justice
advocates’ call for change, and offer seven
recommendations for agencies that, taken together,
would make some important inroads.  Ultimately, we
seek agency decisions that reduce risk, eliminate
disparities, and ensure environmental justice for all.
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